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Abstract 
 
The recent Federal Communications Commission rule making for low power FM 
radio has been widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked the 
Commission for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are 
quantifiable in this case, the preferences of consumers, Congress and the Commission can 
be directly compared. While differences in policy preferences of Congress and the 
regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they appear extremely modest when 
compared to the open entry (welfare maximizing) policy alternative. A financial event 
study reveals that incumbent broadcast station equity values were neither threatened by 
the Commission’s low power FM rules, nor materially enhanced by their reversal in 
Congress. This lends empirical support to the Congressional Dominance view of 
regulation, and illustrates the margins on which blame- and credit-shifting strategies are 
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1. Introduction  
a.  The Delegation Question 
Congress delegates administrative control to regulatory agencies with broad 
“public interest” mandates. Occasionally, however, it intervenes directly, constraining 
regulators with specific legislation. This prompts the question: Who controls regulation?   
The view that “runaway bureaucrats” pursue their own agendas in defiance of 
Congress (Dodd & Schott 1979; Wilson 1980) was answered by Weingast & Moran 
(1983), who showed that enforcement actions of the Federal Trade Commission were 
highly correlated with the political views of Congress, particularly oversight committee 
chairs. This evidence, and the fact that Congress enacted laws directly overturning certain 
FTC initiatives, suggests that Congress controls regulation. 
 The basic logic of the Congressional Dominance perspective developed by 
Weingast & Moran (1983) is shown in Figure 1. Regulatory agency actions are 
characterized in simple, monotonic terms––e.g., the level of antitrust enforcement––on 
the horizontal axis. Preferences for various enforcement levels generate levels of utility 
for Congress, given by  U(C), and the agency, given by  U(A).  The optimal levels for 
Congress and the agency are  C* and  A*,  respectively. A gap between these policy 
positions may arise. Intervention by Congress moves the level of enforcement,  A*, 
towards C*. This pattern is observed both in episodic legislative interventions and in the 
systematic correlation between agency enforcement actions and the ideological make-up 






      
 




                                 
              U(C)                                     U(A) 
     
       
     
                            C*                             A*          Level of Regulation 
Figure 1. Preferences of Congress and the Regulatory Agency 
 
The preferences of Congress change with political trends and member turnover, 
and a range of sanctions may be employed to discipline regulators, keeping agency 
policies in line with new political equilibria.
1 These devices create incentives for agency 
personnel to follow (or even anticipate) congressional demands. Yet, given their 
effectiveness, it is curious that disagreements occasionally balloon to a level where 
statutory constraints are imposed. 
  The transaction costs literature provides a general explanation (Epstein & 
O’Hallorin 1999). Agency costs––the costs to Congress of delegating decision-making to 
an independent regulatory commission––are offset by two factors:  
(1)  The expertise exercised by agency officials allows Congress to regulate far 
more widely, and strategically, than otherwise. Congress employs agents 
just as others do, knowing that conflicts of interest may arise even as 
arrangements produce net gains via the benefits of specialization. 
(2)  When conflicts become substantial, Congress may impose remedies at 
relatively low cost. Indeed, hearings, legislation, or other c orrective 
actions can be undertaken to the benefit of committee chairs and their 
allies who garner support by appearing to reign in “runaway bureaucrats.”  
Under this set of constraints, how far do regulators stray? Weingast & Moran 
(1983) show that, in the 1964-1976 period, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was 
                                                 
1  “There is available to the principal [Congress], however, a large repertoire of mechanisms for reducing 
agency losses  – screening and selection procedures, contract design (including both compensation 
schedules and sanctions for malfeasance), monitoring and reporting requirements, and institutional checks.      
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responsive to the changing political demands of congressional members (particularly 
Senate oversight members). They also note that, pursuant to legislation limiting FTC 
activities in 1979, agency b ehavior was brought into conformity with congressional 
preferences. Yet, neither set of observations calibrates the distance between congressional 
demands and agency actions (i.e., the magnitude of  A*-C*). A positive correlation 
between political changes in Congress and changes in FTC regulatory actions suggests 
that Congress pulls regulation in its direction ( A* approaches  C*), and statutory 
constraints demonstrate that discrete policy interventions may be used to eliminate the 
gap altogether. It remains an open question as to how much leeway independent agencies 
enjoy. 
One recent regulatory episode––the low power FM radio rule making at the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)––provides a rare opportunity to calibrate 
this distance.  Formally initiated in 1999, the low power FM rule making at the FCC 
culminated in an order creating a new class of low power stations, to be licensed to non-
profit community organizations. Congress reacted by enacting legislation in December 
2000 that overruled the FCC, reducing the number of slots available for low power radio 
stations. Like any case study, generalizations must be accompanied by caveats. But the 
political skirmish does offer suggestive results that can inform the debate over principal-
agent relations in economic regulation. What is most promising in this instance is the 
ability to quantify the policy pursued by the FCC, the policy preferred by Congress, and 
the policy maximizing consumer welfare. This factual base allows one to observe how far 
congressional and agency policies differed relative to the underlying economic optimum. 
b. The Low power FM Radio Issue 
News media widely reported that when the FCC attempted to allocate radio 
spectrum for low power FM licenses, it was sharply rebuked by Congress.  As the 
WASHINGTON POST wrote:  
When it became apparent that the usually plodding FCC was on a fast 
track to license low power stations, radio stations already on the air 
became nervous... Under their lobbying group, the National Association of 
                                                                                                                                                 
These mechanisms are themselves costly to invoke, but the principal can choose the mix of mechanisms 
that is most effective and least costly.” (D. Roderick Kiewet and Mathew D. McCubbins, 1991:38).      
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Broadcasters..., existing broadcasters have fought the low power proposal 
with everything they’ve got... The House passed a compromise bill last 
month that would allow a small percentage of these stations to be licensed 
after a testing period. But even the watered-down legislation was meant to 
send [FCC Chairman William E.] Kennard a strong message. “It was clear 
that the FCC thought all along that they could run roughshod through this 
without much opposition,” [Rep. Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio)] Oxley said. 
“We’re hoping that the vote will bring them up short until Congress can 
sort this out.”
2 
  The FCC continued to slowly advance toward licensing low power FM stations, 
however, until “a last minute rider in December’s [2000] Senate appropriations bill 
(which eventually became law) severely handicap[ped] the low power initiative.”
3 This 
gave rise to the consensus view that Congressional action “sharply curtails the ambitious 
plans of the Federal Communications Commission to issue licenses for low power FM 
radio stations to 1,000 or more schools, churches and other small community 
organizations.”
4  
  This high profile battle between Congress and the FCC yields testable 
implications for the Congressional Dominance view of regulation. Most notable is the 
opportunity to identify and measure three rival regulatory optima: 
                                                 
2  Frank Ahrens, Political Static May Block Low power FM; FCC, Congress Battle Over Radio Plan, THE 
WASHINGTON POST  (May 15, 2000), A1. 
3 Sarah Wildman,  Mixed Signals: NPR Sells Out, The New Republic (Feb. 5, 2001), 
www.tnr.com/021201/wildman021201.html. Specifically, it required LPFM stations to provide 3
rd adjacent 
channel protection to existing primary service (full power) FM stations (Congress of the USA, Public Law 
No. 106-553, 106
th Congress, Dec. 21, 2000. Appendix B, Sec. 632). 
4 Stephen Labaton, Congress Severely Curtails Plan For Low power Radio Stations, NEW YORK TIMES 
(December 19, 2000), A1. Wired News reported that “The appropriations bill included legislation by Sen. 
Rod Grams (R-Minnesota) which could delay and restrict the number of 10 to 100 watts licenses handed 
out by the FCC.”  Senate To Vote On Microradio Bill, (October 26, 2000), 
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,39765,00.html (visited on 4/16/01); “The appropriations bill 
President Clinton signed Thursday also delivered a major blow to FCC chairman William  Kennard’s 
campaign to bring diversity back to the radio waves.” Lyssa Graham, New Legislation Hurts Low power 
FM Radio Initiative, MIAMI HERALD (December 22, 2000), 
http://www.herald.com/content/today/national/diagdocs/071199.htm (visited on 12/22/00); “Even as the 
Federal Communications Commission charges ahead with its fast-track licensing drive, powerful forces in 
Washington are pushing hard to halt this train before it leaves the station. The National Association of 
Broadcasters and National Public Radio have led the lobbying in favor of separate attempts in the House 
and Senate to limit low power stations.” Marc Fisher,  Lobbying Against Low power Radio,  American 
Journalism Review (October 2000), 46.      
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•  The FCC’s, represented by its proposal to license about 1,000 low power FM 
stations; 
•  Congress’, which limited licenses to about 600 low power FM stations; 
•  Consumer welfare maximization, achieved by fully utilizing the FM band to 
accommodate non-interfering broadcasters. As estimated below, this would 
allow for nearly 100,000 low power FM stations.
5 
While the FCC’s allotment of low power radio licenses differed from that 
preferred by Congress, both allocations were trivial relative to the level of entry 
possible.
6 When combined with other rules imposed on prospective low power FM 
station applicants, the distance between Congress and the FCC was inconsequential as a 
fraction of total FM band capacity. Hence, the political equilibrium generated by the 
regulatory agent is revealed to differ only slightly from that of the principal. This modest 
difference, however, was large enough for Congress and the FCC to engage in significant 
“credit-claming” and “blame-shifting” (Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1982, McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984), generating gains for incumbent legislators. The results support the 
Congressional Dominance view of regulation. 
II.  FM Radio Regulation by the FCC 
The FM band is divided into 100 channels, with 200 KHz allocated to each. FCC 
regulation controls interference by spacing stations geographically and in frequency 
space. If stations transmit within three channels the FCC imposes minimum distance 
requirements.
7 The simple trade-offs involved in station separation to limit radio 
interference are depicted in Figure 2. In panel (a), radio stations in a local market are 
separated by three adjacent channels on either side. These channels serve as a buffer, but 
are otherwise idle in this market. In panel (b), stations (with identical power transmission   
 
                                                 
5 This estimate abstracts from possible entry into radio broadcasting due to liberalization elsewhere; e.g., in 
the AM radio, or UHF TV bands. 
6 The overly conservative nature of FCC spectrum allocation policy has long been noted. A detailed 
treatment is given in Hazlett (2001). 
7 Code of Federal Regulations, 47 CFR section 73.201, subpart B and section 73.207.       
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Figure 2. Two Channel Separation Rules 
 
and antenna height as in (a)) are separated by just two adjacent channels, meaning that 
more broadcasts (and listener choices) are available. The cost of this enhanced band 
utilization, however, is an increased possibility of harmful interference. With stations 
packed more densely, broadcaster emissions tend to collide more frequently, degrading 
signal quality for listeners. The marginal value of the loss will just equal the marginal 
value of increased program choice in an optimal allocation of radio stations. 
FM stations are classified as either primary or secondary service stations. Primary 
stations are granted interference protection from all other stations; secondary stations are 
granted interference protection only from other secondary stations but not from primary 
stations. The FCC classifies primary stations (commercial and noncommercial) in seven 
categories: Class A, B, B1, C, C1, C2, and C3.
9 
This delineation is based on geographic coverage area, which is a function of two 
variables: (1) effective radiated power, and; (2) antenna height. Increasing either variable 
increases signal coverage. See Table 1. By comparison, new low power FM stations have 





                                                 
8 As noted, the actual FM band consists of one hundred channels; just twenty are shown here. 
9 Code of Federal Regulations, 47 CFR 73.211, October, 1, 1999 edition.      
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Table 1: Classes of Primary Service FM Stations 
Class  Distance to 1mV/m signal 






A  28 (17)  100  6 
B1  39 (24)  100  25 
B  52 (32)  150  50 
C3  39 (24)  100  25 
C2  52 (32)  150  50 
C1  72 (45)  299  100 
C  92 (57)  600  100 
Source: Code of Federal Regulations, 47 CFR 73.210, 73.211. 73.333 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
ERP: Effective radiated power; HAAT: Antenna height above average terrain. 
a By mapping the signal’s contour the FCC can find the distance to the 1 millivolt-per-
meter (mV/m) contour using  the ERP and the HAAT values. The table provides the 
maximum ERP for each class of station, given a reference antenna height (HAAT). 
Antenna height and maximum power are referential values for estimating signal contour 
radius, which is what ultimately determines a station’s class. Stations may transmit at a 
higher ERP than listed on the table if they reduce antenna height. For example WBCT in 
Grand Rapids (MI) transmits at 320 kW, but has an antenna HAAT of 236 meters––less 
than half the reference value in the table (which limits Class C stations to 100 kW.)  
 
Figure 3 illustrates FCC channel separation and minimum distance requirements. 
Assume an existing Class A station is located at the center of the concentric circles 
(called signal contours) and a new Class A station is applying for a license in the same 
area. The new station could transmit on the same channel as the existing station but 
would then locate at least 71 miles away. It could transmit on a 1
st adjacent channel and 
locate 45 miles away. It could transmit on a 2
nd or 3
rd adjacent channel, with 19 miles of 
separation. If it uses three channels of separation or more, the new station would not 
require distance separation from the existing station.
10 
                                                 
10 Primary stations also need to comply with distance requirement against Intermediate Frequency 
Interference (IF) which arises from stations broadcasting 10.6 and 10.8 MHz apart. These distances are 
typically less than those required to protect stations in 2
nd and 3
rd adjacent channels. An additional distance 
requirement applies only to stations in channel 253 to protect TV channel 6 stations (47 CFR 73.207 
paragraph (b), 10/1/99 edition). Finally, another type of distance requirement is to avoid “blanketing 
interference,” which affects all stations geographically located (regardless of frequency) within a radius (R)      
 


















Figure 3: Separation Requirements for Two Class A FM Stations 
III. The FCC’s Low Power Radio Rule Making 
In 1978 the FCC decided it would no longer license Class D 10-watt stations, 
primarily licensed for noncommercial educational use.
11 This raised minimum power 
allotments to 3,000 watts; in 1989 the minimum was raised to 6,000 watts. Entry by low 
power stations was thus precluded.
12 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimated by: R = 0.245 vP ; where R is measured in miles, and P is the maximum effective radiated power 
(ERP) in kilowatts (47 CFR 73.318 [Oct. 1, 1999]).  
11 Federal Communications Commission,  First Report & Order, In the matter of changes in the rules 
relating to noncommercial educational FM broadcast stations, Docket No. 20735, 68 FCC 2d 988, adopted 
June 7, 1978, at 989; Federal Communications Commission,  Second Report & Order, In the matter of 
changes in the rules relating to noncommercial educational FM broadcast stations, Docket No. 20735, 68 
FCC 2d 240, adopted June 7, 1978, at 250, 266-268. See also Martin (1982: 449-451) and Walker (1997: 8-
10). 
12 In theory, class A stations may transmit with less power, but licenses will only be issued to applicants 
with facilities capable of transmitting at the maximum effective radiated power. For class A, these values 
have been (using the standard 100 meters antenna height): 3,000 watts between 1962 and 1989; 6,000 watts 
afterwards. FCC (1962), and FCC (1989). This regulatory practice both raises entry costs for applicants and 
reduces the number of slots available for stations as evaluating interference contours at higher power levels 
than are actually used increases perceived transmission conflicts. 
R=71 







R=45 miles  
R=19 miles      
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While the FCC was increasing minimum power requirements for radio stations, 
the cost of low power transmitters was dropping rapidly.
13 Consequently, the 1980s and 
1990s saw increasing numbers of “pirate radio stations.”  The FCC, under pressure from 
licensed broadcasters, shut down scores of unauthorized stations.
14 Unlicensed 
broadcasters have challenged FCC rules in court, but none have prevailed.
15 
   On  July 17, 1997, Nickolaus Leggett, Judith Leggett, and Donald Schellhardt 
petitioned the FCC (RM-9208) to create a new low power radio service. They proposed 
that one channel be allocated in both the AM and FM bands to provide a new one-watt 
micro-radio service (Leggett et al, 1997). On February 20, 1998, another petition (RM-
9242) was filed by J. Rodger Skinner, who proposed the creation of three classes of low 
power service in the FM band: 1) A primary service with an effective radiated power 
between 50 and 3,000 watts; 2) a secondary service with an effective radiated power 
below 50 watts; and 3) a special event service with an effective radiated power under 20 
watts, authorizations not to exceed 10 days. The primary service would be required to 
comply with the existing criteria for co-channel and first adjacent channel separation 
(Skinner 1998). 
The FCC requested public comment on the petitions,
16 triggering a formal rule 
making process. Rulings in that process were issued in January 1999, January 2000, and 
September 2000,
17 as outlined in Appendix 1. While the Commission eventually 
                                                 
13 Stephen Dunifer (Radio Free Berkeley), Doug Brewer (Temple Terrace Community Radio in Florida), 
and Ernest Wilson (Pan-Com international) sold transmitters for $150-200 (Soley 1999: 104). These kits 
created stations broadcasting over a two-mile radius.  
14  For a detailed recount of the history of pirate radio see Soley (1999: 58-84). See also Walker (2001). 
15 For a recount of Kantako’s Black Liberation Radio and Stephen Dunifer’s Radio Free Berkeley see Soley 
(1999: 75-76, 88-90, 98-99). See also Phillip Taylor Godfather Of Low power Radio Back On Air Despite 
Shutdown, The Freedom Forum Online (November 16, 2000), 
 www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?document ID=3429 (visited 4/19/01). For other cases 
like that of North Dakota farmer Roy Neset or Alan Freed in Minneapolis,  see,  Radio Free America: 
Fighting the FCC’s Assault on Free Speech, Institute for Justice, www.ij.org/clients/ftc/body.shtml; Micro-
broadcaster Seeks Vindication of Free Speech Rights in the First Micro-radio Case to Reach the US 
Supreme Court, Institute f or Justice, www.ij.org/media/1ammend/microradio/10%5F4%5F00pr.shtml 
(visited on April 2, 2001). 
16 Public Notice: Report No. 2254, February 5, 1998; Public Notice: Report No. 2261, March 10, 1998.  
17 Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Proposed Rule Making: In the matter of creation of low 
power radio service, MM Docket No. 99-25, FCC 99-6 (January 28, 1999); Federal Communications 
Commission, Report and Order: In the matter of creation of low power radio service, MM Docket No. 99-
25, FCC 00-19 (January 20, 2000); Federal Communications Commission,  Memorandum Opinion and 
Order: In the matter of creation of low power radio service, MM Docket No. 99-25, FCC 00-349 
(September 28, 2000).      
 
          10
 
 
authorized up to 1,000 new low power FM stations, restrictions increased from start to 
finish. Congressional activity likely influenced this outcome, as hearings, legislation, and 
statements by key committee members on the subject of low power FM were frequently 
reported in the trade press.
18 These statements were overwhelmingly critical of the FCC 
for being too liberal (pro low power FM entry) in its rule making. A summary of the main 
events in Congress is given in Appendix 2. 
In the conventional wisdom, the FCC promoted a liberal allocation of low power 
FM licenses, while Congress sharply redesigned the policy outcome by harshly reducing 
available low power FM licenses.
19  If true, this episode could raise troubling questions 
for the Congressional Dominance view of delegation; even as Congress eventually 
stepped in to constrain the regulatory agency, such a substantial schism would expose a 
potentially substantial principal-agent problem. Fortuitously, the theory yields testable 
implications. Before turning to these tests, however, we examine one additional policy 
detail: the outcome of a low power FM rule maximizing consumer surplus.  
IV.  An Estimate of FM Band Low power Station Insert Capacity 
How many 100-watt FM radio stations could be slotted into U.S. radio markets 
without posing unacceptable interference to existing FM stations? A simple model can 
estimate this number to a first approximation.
20 This model does not predict economic 
viability; a market test would be necessary to establish how many low power FM stations 
listeners, advertisers, or contributors would support. But it does answer a relevant policy 
question. In the absence of arguments to the contrary, open entry creates the standard 
                                                 
18 “Our bill says before you run full speed ahead with these licenses, make sure that the interference 
requirements are adhered to,” said Representative Michael G. Oxley…” House Clears Bill To Curb Plans 
For FM, Stephen Labaton, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 14, 2000); “…Chairman Kennard, wanting this as 
his legacy, pushed this issue before it was fully and completely tested’, said Representative Bill Tauzin…” 
Religious groups at odds with G.O.P. on radio licenses, David Leonhardt, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 11, 
2000).  
19 See:  THE WASHINGTON POST ,  Budget Bill Curbs Low power Radio; Stations Would Be Kept out of 
Cities, E03, Frank Ahrens (December 20, 2000); THE WASHINGTON POST, Political Static May Block Low 
power FM; FCC, Congress Battle Over Radio Plan, A01, Frank Ahrens (May 15, 2000); THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL,  Panel Clears Bill to Curb Low power Radio Station, A8 (March 30, 2000);  THE 
WASHINGTON POST , D.C. to Get Low power FM Permits, if Programs Survives, E01, Frank Ahrens (March 
28, 2000). 
20 For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix 3      
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optimum of a competitive equilibrium.
21  Hence, by estimating the capacity of possible 
low power FM station assignments, we develop a benchmark policy that quantifies the 
optimal regulatory outcome. 
We assume that the FM band is fixed, and that one hundred 20-kHz channels are 
allocated to each FM radio market––i.e., the status quo.
22 We further assume that within 
each local market, every existing FM station will continue to enjoy exclusive use of its 
broadcast frequency and (as buffers) the channels bordering either side.
23 There are 269 
unique U.S. radio markets.
24 New 100-watt low power FM stations are given co-channel 
protection by keeping a distance between them such that no station transmits within the 
coverage area of another low power FM station.  
Our assumed standard follows Rappaport et al. (1999).
25  The study points out 
that the 3 -channel separation rule was established when older technology made FM 
radios more susceptible to drifts, adjacent channel capture, and adjacent channel overload 
than in modern FM receivers (Rappaport et al. 1999: 3, 6).
26 “The FCC protection ratios 
                                                 
21 This is not only the conclusion of w elfare economics, but of FCC policy makers. See Rosston & 
Steinberg (January 1997: 7). Also Owen (1999:59-70), and Comment of Thirty-Seven Concerned 
Economists (2001). Berry and Waldfogel (1999) argue that free entry in broadcasting is not socially 
optimal due to excessive competitive investment which “cannibalizes” existing audiences. Even if the free 
entry assumptions were correctly applied to radio broadcasting (which as the low power FM episode 
shows, is subject to severe regulatory entry barriers), consumer surplus is still maximized via a policy of 
open entry. 
22  FM technical standards were set decades ago, prior to the advent of digital tuning devices, and were the 
FCC to permit stations to broadcast with less separation (thereby creating more listening choices), radio 
manufacturers would gain the incentive to produce receivers with improved ability to process signals on 
adjacent frequencies. In assuming such regulatory options away, the estimate of FM station insertion 
capacity is a conservative one. 
23 In other words, each licensee is granted exclusive use of three channels within the local market area. This 
is a stronger restriction than imposing minimum distance requirements. The rationale for this separation 
rule is given below. 
24 According to Arbitron Radio Market Ranking (Fall 1999) there are 276 metropolitan radio markets in the 
United States. Seven of these markets are embedded in larger markets, however. To avoid double counting, 
we combine these duplicates. See: www.arbitron.com/radiosurvey/mm001025.htm. These markets do not 
exhaustively cover U.S. households, as many small towns and rural markets are unranked. Indeed, only 
about one-half of U.S. stations broadcast in designated radio markets. BIA Financial, The 1999 State of the 
Industry Radio Report, Executive Summary, 2; www.biacompanies.com/state_radio.htm. This also implies 
substantial under-estimation of low power FM insert capacity in our model.  
25 The principal author, Theodore Rappaport, is an engineering professor and Founder of the Mobile and 
Portable Radio Research Group at the Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute. See: http://www.mprg.ee.vt.edu/people/ tsr/rappaport.html.  
26 Federal Communications Commissions’ radio interference rules have been in place since the 1940s. See 
Moffet, Larson & Johnson, Inc. “Selection of Receivers for FM Receiver Testing and Analysis of Test 
Results in Support of the Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters in MM Docket 99-25.” 
Cited in Rappaport et al (1999: 41).      
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were designed to provide simple and conservative spacing,” the study notes, “to prevent 
early FM radio receivers from undesired retuning to strong adjacent stations.” T he 
authors add that conservative assumptions in the FCC propagation models insure that 
radio stations are more widely spaced than necessary.
27 
  Indeed, the FCC has tested the one channel FM separation rule used here and 
found it sufficient to limit interference between full-power stations. In a 1997 FCC 
Report and Order
28 the Commission cites a study by the National Association of 
Broadcasters that estimated a total of 312 FM radio stations broadcast on 2
nd or 3
rd 
adjacent channels without adherence to minimum distance standards. These so-called 
short-spaced commercial stations have operated for decades without complaint or 
regulatory correction, indicating that harmful interference is not present under the 
Commission’s revealed standard.
29 Since 100-watt stations emit far less possible 
interference than do full power stations, using this time tested separation rule to estimate 
capacity for low power stations appears reasonable. 
Given the assumptions above, the number of available channels in each market 
equals 100-3X, where X is the number of FM stations already operating. Because 100-
watt stations have a signal contour radius of 3.5 miles,
30 the minimum distance separation 
between 100-watt stations would be 7 miles. We increase this distance to 8 miles and 
assume that each 100-watt station would “occupy” a square area of 8x8 miles. Hence, the 
total number of 100-watt stations the FM band could accommodate per market is: 
[100-3X][Area in sq. mi/64]. 
This estimate, however, excludes the “blanketing” effect of existing FM stations 
on future low power FM stations. Blanketing occurs when a nearby FM station’s signal 
                                                 
27 Formally, the FCC seeks to guarantee a minimum signal-to-noise ratio at the edge of the signal contour. 
These ratios are then used to calculate the required distance separation between stations to avoid 
interference.  Yet, the ratios used by the FCC do not relate to actual signal-to-noise ratios in the field, 
which are much higher, and thus yield much better audio quality (Rappaport 1999: 43-45, 47).  
28 Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order: In the Matter of Grand-fathered Short-spaced 
FM Stations; MM Docket 96-120 (August 4, 1997).  
29 The FCC stated that “….The small risk of interference is far outweighed by the improvements in 
flexibility and improved service…..” FCC (1997: par. 29). The FCC ruled in favor of eliminating 2
nd and 
3
rd adjacent channel spacing requirements for grandfathered short-spaced stations authorized prior to 1964 
(ibid par. 23).  
30 According to the FCC a 100-watt station with and antenna height of 98 feet (30m) would produce a 
1mv/m (60dBu) signal contour at a distance of 3.5 miles. Federal Communications Commission, NPRM: In 
the Matter of Creation of Low Power Radio Service, MM Docket No. 99-25 (Jan. 28, 1999), par. 30.      
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overloads all other signals in the immediate area, including those broadcasting on distant 
frequencies.  The circular blanketing area has been estimated as having a radius of 2.5 
miles for the most powerful (Class C) FM stations, or 18.9 square miles (Rappaport et al. 
1999: 21-2). To be conservative, we increase the blanketing area to the same value 
assumed for the contour area of a 100-watt low power FM station, or 64 square miles.  
Adjusting our equation to account for blanketing interference, and summing over 
269 radio markets, yields the following equation: 





64 / ) 64 ( 3 100
i
i i i X Area X Y  
where Xi is the number of existing FM stations in market i and Y is the number of licenses 
for low power FM service that can be accommodated on the FM dial. As seen in Table 2, 
this estimation yields a large low power insert capacity for the FM band: 306,805 
stations. Even when we cap the density of low power FM stations per market at one per 
1,000 population,
31 the band maintains an insertion capacity of 97,701 new 100-watt 
stations. This estimate of the potential supply of licenses is very likely a lower bound due 
to the conservative assumptions applied.
32 
                                                 
31 Since the smaller markets are typically less dense and have fewer radio stations broadcasting, their 
insertion capacity is greatest. Capping insert capacity with an arbitrary constraint helps limit this fact from 
skewing results. As seen in Table 2, medium and small sized radio markets often face a binding constraint 
in this imposed cap. 
32 Note that our estimation does not provide insertion capacity for new low power FM stations in the top 
four markets. In practice, such markets allow abundant space for such stations, however, as shown by the 
FCC’s original plan to allocate low power FM licenses to some of these markets (Federal Communications 
Commission, Report No. 24760. Broadcast Applications, June 21, 2000.  http://www.fcc.gov/ Bureaus/ 
Mass_Media/Public_Notices/Brdcst_ Applications/ap000621.txt. See also Federal Communications 
Commission, Report No. 24820, Broadcast Applications, Sept. 15, 2000).    
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Table 2: Low power FM Station Insert Capacity Nationwide and in Selected Markets 
 
Rank  Radio Market 

























1  New York, NY  14,449,700  7,796  69  0  0  0  14,500  0 
2  Los Angeles, CA  10,347,700  4,850  38  0  0  0  10,348  0 
3  Chicago, IL  7,147,300  5,619  46  0  0  0  7,4147  0 
4  San Francisco, CA  5,812,200  7,369  62  0  0  0  5,812  0 
5  Philadelphia, PA  4,063,000  3,518  19  2,364  817  1,547  4,063  1,547 
6  Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX  3,928,600  6,968  32  435  128  307  3,929  307 
7  Detroit, MI  3,826,600  4,466  23  2,163  713  1,450  3,827  1,450 
8  Boston, MA  3,724,100  3,105  24  1,359  672  687  3,724  687 
9  Washington, DC  3,664,600  3,967  29  806  377  429  3,665  429 
10  Houston, Galveston, TX  3,613,700  7,107  29  1,444  377  1,067  3,614  1,067 
1-10  Large markets total        8,571  3,181  5,487  60,579  5,487 
                   
134  Appleton-Oshkosh, WI  289,700  1,399  13  1,333  793  540  290  290 
135  Peoria, IL  289,200  1,797  13  1,712  793  919  289  289 
136  Biloxi-Gulfport-
Pascagoula, MS 
286,700  1,785  13  1,701  793  908  287  287 
137  Atlantic City-Cape May, NJ  286,600  816  18  587  828  0  287  0 
138  Trenton, NJ  284,800  226  5  300  425  0  285  0 
139  Stamford-Norwalk, CT  283,300  210  4  289  352  0  283  0 
140  Tyler-Longview, TX  272,500  2,101  15  1,806  825  981  273  273 
141  Newburgh-Middletown 
(Mid-Hudson Valley), NY 
270,900  816  9  931  657  274  271  271 
142  Montgomery, AL  266,400  2,008  10  2,196  700  1,496  266  266 
143  Eugene-Springfield, OR  265,200  4,554  9  5,195  657  4,538  265  265 
134-143  Mid-size markets total        16,050  6,823  9,656  2,796  1,941    
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267  Jackson, TN  72,000  557  11  583  737  0  72  0 
268  Bangor, ME  71,400  352  12  352  768  0  71  0 
269  Beckley, WV  67,800  1,271  6  1,628  492  1,136  68  68 
270  Mason City, IA  67,800  1,469  8  1,744  608  1,136  68  68 
271  Jonesboro, AR  66,100  711  8  844  608  236  66  66 
271  Cheyenne, WY  64,300  2,686  9  3,064  657  2,407  64  64 
273  Great Falls, MT  63,300  2,698  5  3,583  425  3,158  63  63 
274  Meridian, MS  61,200  1,380  10  1,509  700  809  61  61 
275  Brunswick, GA  56,500  1,052  7  1,299  553  746  57  57 
276  Casper, WY  50,600  5,340  8  6,341  608  5,733  51  51 
267-276  Smallest markets total        20,947  6,156  15,361  641  498 
                   
1-276   All markets total  183,127,000  606,292  3,736  488,179    306,805    97,701 
 
 
Notes: Nassau-Suffolk (NY), Monmouth-Ocean (NJ), Morristown (NJ), and Stamford-Norwalk (CT) included in New York City market; San Jose and Santa 
Rosa included in San Francisco market; New Bedford-Fall River (MA) included in Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket market; Frederick (MD) included in 
Washington, D.C.market. 
a Based on Arbitron radio markets 
b Square miles. Based on Arbitron definition of market areas which follows U.S. Census Bureau Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 
c Data from BIA Research, Inc., Radio Yearbook 2000. 
d Assuming each 100-watt station is located in the center of an 8x8 mile square area (see Appendix). 
e Formula implicitly assumes a blanketing area of 64 square miles. 
Sources: Arbitron Radio Market Rankings- Fall 1999. http://www.arbitron.com/radiosurvey/mm001025.htm . U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Resources. 
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_ma.txt.BIA Research, Inc., Radio Yearbook 2000. Investing In Series.      
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V.  Three Policy Optima 
We may now compare the revealed policy preferences of Congress (C*) and the 
FCC (A*), and contrast these preferences with the policy of open entry (E*). See Figure 
4. While the differences between Congress and the FCC appear large in isolation, putting 
the regulatory skirmish in context produces a dramatically different conclusion. The 
preferred numerical outcome for Congress was about 600 low power FM licenses,
33 
while the FCC authorized approximately 1,000.
34 Either allocation is trivial, compared to 
the pro-consumer solution. Existing broadcasters would not face substantial marketplace 
competition no matter which plan were adopted. The agent is observed to be obedient to 
the principal despite considerable public conflict.
35  
Utility 
                 C*  A*                                      E* 
              
 
 
                600 1,000  97,701  LPFM Licenses   
Figure 4. Policy Optima for Congress, FCC, and Consumer Welfare Maximization 
                                                 
33 The estimate for Congress is based on the Federal Communications Commission’s Public Notice: Notice 
of Acceptance of Low Power FM Broadcast Applications And Notification of Petition to Deny Deadline 
(December 21, 2000) in which the FCC lists 255 applications filed in the first two low power FM windows 
which fully comply with the new rules set by Congress and which are not in conflict with any other 
application. These two windows represents two-fifth of the window fillings, thus by linear extrapolation we 
get a total of 637 licenses for the five window fillings. Another estimate is obtained by weighting by 
population. Using data of population by state, we find that the two first window fillings represent 41.4 
percent of the U.S. population. By linear extrapolation we find 617 licenses. 
34 The Federal Communications Commission never explicitly quantified its planned allotment of licenses. 
The 1,000 estimate is based on press releases, and news articles. For example: “The new [LPFM] stations, 
which the FCC estimates could number ‘as many as 1,000 or perhaps even more,’ would operate at power 
levels of between 10 and 100 watts” FCC Is Set to Open Airwaves to Low power Radio, Kathy Chen, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, page B12 (January 17, 2000). 
35  “Legislation was meant to send [FCC Chairman William] Kennard a strong message. ‘It was clear that 
the FCC thought all along that they could run roughshod through this without much opposition’, [Rep. 
Michael] Oxley said. ‘We’re hoping that the vote will bring them up short until Congress can sort this 
out.’” Frank Ahrens, Political Static May Block Low power FM; FCC, Congress Battle Over Radio Plan, 
THE WASHINGTON POST , (May 15, 2000), A1; “ ‘The FCC has moved without any consideration of the 
facts,’ said Representative John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan. ‘This is a reasonable common sense 
compromise. It will protect the broadcasters, it will protect the licensees, and above all else, it will protect 
listeners of the FM radio spectrum.’ ” Stephen Labaton, House Clears Bill to Curb Plans for FM, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (April 14, 2000), C1.       
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Non-quantifiable regulations are also important in the low power FM proceeding 
and they strongly reinforce this conclusion. These regulations, perhaps more than the 
numerical limits on new licenses, severely constrained entry by low power stations in the 
FCC’s rule making. These regulatory constraints outlined in Appendix 1, include: 
a.  severe limits on license aggregation, pre-empting important economies of 
scale realized by broadcast chains;
36 
b.  prohibition on license ownership by newspapers, for-profit firms, radio or TV 
stations, pre-empting  economies of scope and eliminating funding   
opportunities in financial markets;
37 
c.  prohibition of advertising, blocking direct competition in the revenue-
generating markets occupied by incumbent broadcasters;
38 
d.  requirements (through licensing preferences) for eight daily hours of original 
programming, an imposing burden for small-scale community enterprises;
39 
e.  prohibition on pirate radio applicants, excluding the one social segment that 
has accumulated a modicum of human capital in owning and operating low-
budget community stations; 
f.  severe power limits, constraining station coverage and financial viability.
40 
                                                 
36  “We will require that for the first two years of LPFM service, any one entity may own only one LPFM 
station (…). After the first two years, to bring into use whatever low power stations remain available but 
unapplied for, we will allow one entity to own up to five stations nationally, and after the first three years 
of service, we will allow an entity to own up to ten stations nationwide.” FCC (2000a: par. 39); “We will 
restrict local ownership and allow one entity to own only one LPFM stations in a community.” (Ibid par. 
44).  
37  “We will prohibit common ownership of LPFM and any other broadcast station, including translators, 
and low power television stations, as well as other media subject  to our ownership rules (…). This 
prohibition is national and absolute in nature, unlike our existing cross-media ownership rules. Thus, for 
example, a newspaper cannot have an attributable interest in any LPFM station, regardless of whether the 
newspaper and LPFM station are co-located.” FCC (2000a: par.29). 
38 “We have also decided to prohibit operating agreements in any form, including time brokerage 
agreements, local marketing or management agreements.” FCC (2000a: par. 29); “We will establish LPFM 
as a noncommercial educational service.” (Ibid par. 17). By establishing low power FM service as 
noncommercial educational stations the FCC prohibited them from advertising as stated in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 47 CFR 73.503 paragraph (d) October 1, 1999 edition.  
39 “ Applicants that pledge to originate locally at least eight hours off programming per day will be assigned 
one point” FCC (2000a: par. 144). The point system developed by the FCC is for the selection of mutually 
exclusive applications. Applicants with 12 or more hours per day of local programming have preference 
over those with less local programming. 
40 See FCC (2000a: par. 11-14).      
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Even prior to congressional intervention, FCC rules ensured that low power 
stations will prove expensive to operate and difficult to fund. As Rodger Skinner, one of 
the two petitioners to initiate the low power FM rule making, comments: 
With my engineering background I know what it takes to have a listenable 
signal with given power and antenna height...Too many commenters in the 
low power FM proceeding filed comments requesting very low power 
levels since they were not familiar with coverage vs power/antenna height. 
Many pirate operators wanted low powers just to "play radio." I opposed 
them since this was not a "play" thing that I was attempting to create, but 
rather a full-fledged new broadcasting service. Another huge blow came 
when the FCC limited low power FM (LPFM) to non-commercial use 
only. This left station operators with no way to support a real radio station. 
Of course, there were those who are happy with any crumbs the FCC 
might throw their way. I posted a tombstone with "LPFM" on it on Jan 
20
th [2000] when the FCC issued its report and order, proposing a severely 
watered down version of what I had proposed. In my mind LPFM died 
that day!
41  
Ironically, the constraints on low power FM stations were enthusiastically 
advanced by low power FM’s most ardent public supporters. These include FCC Chair 
William E. Kennard, who was often lauded in the press as the beleaguered champion of 
community radio stations, and the Media Access Project, a non-profit law firm that 
lobbied vigorously for low power FM, but also for strict rules limiting low power FM 
stations to non-profit status and prohibiting multiple station ownership, cross-ownership, 
and advertising.
42 
VI.   Low power FM Policies and Full-Power Radio Station Equity Values 
  The above analysis carries testable implications. If Congress battled the FCC for 
control of low power FM licensing policy, financial markets would predictably react to 
                                                 
41 Email to Thomas W. Hazlett (March 24, 2001).      
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evident changes in the political conflict. Conversely, if Congress were seen by investors 
as having stable preferences and effectively exercising those preferences throughout the 
policy making process, the asset values of radio stations would not be materially affected 
as legislative and regulatory events made news in the low power FM rule making.  
In this section we perform an event study to determine if financial markets 
perceived either FCC rulings or Congressional actions as impacting the profitability of 
existing radio broadcasters. We consider announcements of changes in FCC low power 
FM rules, either at the Commission or in Congress, as well as stories about the low power 
FM rule appearing in the New York Times or Wall Street Journal. We examine excess 
returns to shareholders in relatively “pure” firms owning AM and FM radio stations (i.e., 
full-power commercial incumbents) over three-day periods [t-1 to t+1] (“t” being the day 
of an event in the FCC or Congress, or of a story about the regulatory proceedings in the 
press).  We extend the standard “market model” (Fama 1996: 66-70), including a dummy 
variable to estimate excess event-period returns (Binder 1985): 
  Rit = ai + bMt + c Dt + eit ,            (1) 
where R it = the return of the ith firm on day t; ai is the individual effect of the ith firm, 
assumed constant over time; M t = market return on day t; D t = 1 if there is an event 
window on day t, 0 if not; and eit is the error term. 
The premise behind event studies is that capital markets incorporate available 
public information into securities prices without bias, signaling how new information is 
anticipated to affect future returns. If investors perceive rulings as lowering future 
profitability of incumbent firms (either through greater competitiveness for audience 
share, or by harmful interference, or both), then we expect to observe below market 
returns for shareholders of incumbent firms during event windows in which the 
probability of low power FM entry rises. The reverse would be witnessed (i.e. positive 
incumbent share returns) when news of congressional intervention lowered the likelihood 
of low power FM entry. This implies a joint H0:  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 See Comments filed by the Media Access Project on behalf of the United Church of Christ, et al., August 
2, 1999, pages 10-12, 19-20. http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/lpfm/lpfmfilings.html (visited April      
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For low power FM events at the FCC: c < 0 
For low power FM events in Congress: c > 0 
Data. Our sample of six radio broadcasters is listed in Table 3.
43  
  
Table 3: Profile of Radio Broadcast Firms 
Firm  Profile 
Cox Radio Inc.  National radio broadcasting co. owns, operates, and develops radio 
stations in the U.S. As of December 1999, Cox Radio owned and/or 
operated 83 radio stations in 17 markets. Approximately 73% of net 
revenues are generated from local radio advertising. 
Entercom 
Communications 
Fourth largest radio broadcasting company in the U.S. based on 
revenues. As of December 1999, the company had 96 radio stations 
(60 FM and 36 AM) in 17 markets. 
Radio One  Radio broadcasting firm primarily targeting African-Americans. The 
company has approximately 40 radio stations. 
Citadel 
Communications 
Owns approximately 136 FM stations and 61 AM stations in 42 mid-
sized markets. Virtually all of the company’s revenues are generated 




The third largest radio broadcasting company in the U.S. based on 
number of stations. Upon conclusion of pending acquisitions, the firm 
will own 324 radio stations (228 FM and 96 AM). Virtually all of the 
firm’s revenues are generated from the sale of local, regional and 
national advertising time on its radio stations.  
Hispanic 
Broadcasting 
Spanish-language  radio broadcasting company that owns 45 radio 
stations in 13 U.S. markets. In addition the company operates the 
HBC Radio Network, a Spanish-language radio broadcast network 
serving the U.S. market.   
Source: http://biz.yahoo.com/research/indgrp/brdcst_radio_tv.html (visited Feb. 6, 2001). 
Eleven events in Congress signified potentially substantial developments on the 
low power FM initiative. The first occurred November 17, 1999, when Rep. Oxley 
introduced HR-3439, a bill to ban the FCC from ruling on low power FM service. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
25, 2001). 
43 Publicly listed firms owning radio broadcast stations were identified by examining the firms listed in the 
“Broadcasting & Cable TV” sector by Yahoo!Finance. Available at http://biz.yahoo.com/research/ 
indgrp/brdcst_radio_tv.html (visited February 6, 2001). Of the 38 firms listed, we selected only those that 
principally derive company sales from radio broadcasting in the United States, and had sufficient trading 
data (including volume) for meaningful analysis.       
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last event occurred February 27, 2001, when Senator John McCain introduced S-404, a 
bill creating a mechanism for resolving interference disputes resulting from new low 
power FM service. See table 4. 
Five FCC developments signaled potential changes in low power FM rules. The first 
occurred on February 5, 1998, when the FCC issued a Public Notice (Report No. 2254) 
asking for comments on Leggett and Schellhardt’s petition. Then came the Public Notice 
issued March 10, 1998, referencing Skinner’s petition. Next came adoption of the Notice of 




                                                 
44  We eliminated those observations of events falling within the 3-day period of a stock down or upgrade 
listed under “Analyst History” on Yahoo!Finance. We extended this criteria to two days before the event [t-
2] as the effect of the down or upgrade may extend past one day, or be made after hours. This rule led to the 
elimination of one observation (Sept. 7, 2000) for Cox Radio Inc (CXR) and three observations (October 
27, 26 and 25, 2000) for Citadel Communications Corp. (CITC).  On October 25, 2000, five analysts 
downgraded Citadel Communications Corp. See http://biz.yahoo.com/c/c/citc.html (visited on Feb. 15, 
2001). We did not find news reports on Yahoo!Finance of any merger or takeover activity involving our 
firms during event windows.    
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Table 4: Response of Stock Prices to Congressional Events: Three-day (%) Change [t-1 to t+1] 









Nov 17, 1999  Rep. Oxley introduces HR-3439  2.19  5.07  1.78  -1.71  4.07  8.47  2.46  1.08  1.17 
Feb 10, 2000  Sen. Gregg introduces S-2068 
 
-3.79  3.09  -6.40  -5.68  -9.47  -12.99  0.06  -2.25  -1.44 
Apr 10, 2000  Commerce Committee Report No. 
106-567 on HR-3439 
-0.05  3.99  -7.59  -9.81  -7.26  -5.45  -4.93  -6.31  -5.12 
Apr 13, 2000  Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act 
of 2000 passes [Vote:274-110] 
-9.60  -11.74  -11.49  -15.48  -8.35  -14.42  -12.84  -2.69  -2.79 
May 8, 2000  Sen. McCain introduces S-2518 
 
0.18  0.41  1.59  -13.65  -3.12  -0.48  -19.78  -1.98  -6.02 
Jul 27, 2000  Sen. McCain introduces S-2989 
 
-3.70  2.32  -11.63  -4.28  9.59  1.32  -5.38  2.22  2.36 
Sept 7, 2000  Sen. Grams introduces S-3020 
 
-0.83  N/A  0.36  -12.00  2.21  -4.67  -14.95  -3.84  -4.98 
Oct 25, 2000  Rep. Rogers introduces HR-5548. 
 
-2.25  -9.60  -13.69  -3.94  N/A  -6.17  10.48  -3.93  -2.34 
Oct 26, 2000  Conference Rep. No.106-1005 
passes [Vote:206-198] 
-1.33  -9.64  -9.24  -6.25  N/A  -10.26  0.23  -7.91  -5.70 
Oct 27, 2000  Sen. approves Conference Rep. No. 
106-1005 
2.47  0.32  14.91  1.67  N/A  -1.30  6.58  -0.81  1.96 
Feb 27, 2001  Sen. McCain introduces S-404  -0.48  6.84  -3.78  3.90  0.00  -1.23  -1.27  -0.14  1.22 
  Cumulative return                -26.56  -21.69 
SP500 = Standards & Poors 500 Index; CXR = Cox Radio Inc; ETM = Entercom Communications; ROIA = Radio One Inc; CITC = Citadel Communications; 
CMLS = Cumulus Media Inc; HSP = Hispanic Broadcasting; N/A = Not available. 
a Adjusted median (%)= Equally-weighted median price change of 6 firms(%)––Market index change(%). 
b Adjusted mean (%) = Equally-weighted mean price change of 6 firms(%)––Market index change(%).    
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Table 5: Response of Stock Prices to FCC Rulings: Three-day (%) Change [t-1 to t+1] 








Feb 5, 1998  Public Notice Report No. 2254 
 
0.64  1.71  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  7.92  4.18  4.18 
Mar 10, 1998  Public Notice Report No. 2261 
 
1.21  2.22  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  -3.56  -1.88  -1.88 
Jan 28, 1999  Adoption of Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making 
 
2.18  10.40  N/A  N/A  -3.83  3.03  0.27  -0.53  0.29 
Jan 20, 2000  Adoption of Report and Order 
 
-0.95  11.67  11.99  -3.79  8.92  8.92  5.34  9.87  8.12 
Sept 20, 2000  Adoption of Memorandum Opinion 
and Order 
 
0.31  -1.05  -8.05  -25.17  -12.58  -4.86  0.00  -6.77  -8.93 
  Cumulative                4.86  1.77 
SP500 = Standards & Poors 500 Index; CXR = Cox Radio Inc; ETM = Entercom Communications; ROIA = Radio One Inc; CITC = Citadel Communications; 
CMLS = Cumulus Media Inc; HSP = Hispanic Broadcasting; N/A = Not available. 
a Adjusted median(%)= Equally-weighted median price change of 6 firms(%)––Market index change(%). 
b Adjusted mean (%) = Equally-weighted mean price change of 6 firms(%)––Market index change(%).      
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Regression analysis of policy events. We examine daily returns of broadcasting 
shares, February 2, 1998––March 8, 2001. We use panel data estimation with fixed 
effects to control for unobserved firm specific characteristics. By doing so, we expect to 
reduce the problem raised by omitting right-hand side variables (Johnston and DiNardo 
1997: 395-8).  The estimated regression, Equation (2), is slightly modified from the 
general form presented in Equation (1): 
 
it t t t i it e CONG FCC M r + + + + = 3 2 1 0 b b b b         (2) 
where rit = 3-day percentage change of firm “i” stock price measured at day “t”; 
ß0i = is the fixed-effect of firm “i”, taken as constant over time; 
Mt = 3-day percentage change of a market index such as the SP500 at day “t”; 
FCCt = dummy variable with a value of one if on day “t” occurred a FCC ruling 
on low power FM, zero otherwise;  
CONGt = dummy variable with a value of one if on day “t” occurred an event in 
Congress related to the low power FM initiative, zero otherwise; 
eit = residual term of firm “i” returns at time “t.” 
 
We also test a slightly different specification. Because some events in Congress 
inspired attack from the National Association of Broadcasters, it is likely that 
Congressional events have differing signs. For example, Senator McCain introduced S-
2989, S-2518, and S-404 that defended the FCC’s low power FM initiative. We construct 
an alternative dummy excluding the McCain bills, while including a new dummy for the 
McCain bills. Thus we estimate two regressions with differing sets of congressional 
events. In each regression we compute efficient standard errors using the Newey-West 
robust covariance matrix.
45 
                                                 
45 We tested for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and non-normality in the distribution of error terms. 
The Durbin-Watson test provided evidence of first order autocorrelation while the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test indicated heteroskedasticity in error terms. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test uses a Lagrange multiplier 
statistic with a Chi-square distribution (White 1997: 182). Finally we used a Chi-square goodness of fit test 
to check for normality of error terms (White 1997: 18-20). In both specifications we rejected the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed error terms at a five per cent significance level. These results violate the 
usual assumptions used in ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Therefore OLS estimates, although 
unbiased and consistent, would be inefficient (Johnston and DiNardo 1997: 176).  To correct for inefficient 
standard errors in the ordinary least squares results, we used the Newey-West robust covariance matrix that 
allows for within group (firms in our case) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West 1987; 
Greene 1997: 504-6). The results appear in Table 6 in specifications 1 and 2. For comparative purposes we      
 




Table 6: Regression Results for FCC and Congressional Events 
   Dependent variable is 3-day change (%) returns to broadcast station equity owners. 
 
Variables  OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors 
  Bootstrap estimates 
(10,000 iterations) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
















All Congressional events  -1.884 
(-2.195)** 
    -1.88 
(-1.72)*** 
 
Congressional events except 
McCain bills 
 
  -2.299 
(-2.44)** 
    -2.296 
(-1.76)*** 
McCain bills    -0.872 
(-0.49) 
    -0.871 
(-0.43) 
No. observations  3901  3901    N/A  N/A 
R-squared  0.104  0.104    N/A  N/A 
t statistics in parentheses; * = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; *** = 90% confidence 
level; N/A = Not applicable. 
 
From Specification 1 in Table 6, the broadcast station owner returns appear 
positively and highly related to the change on the SP500 market index. This is 
anticipated, and the estimated beta of 1.3 (for the six firms) is reasonable. Events in 
Congress are negatively correlated with shareholder returns, however, and statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. While returns are also negatively correlated 
with FCC rulings, the coefficients are small and lack statistical significance. Similar 
results are obtained using the bootstrap technique. 
The most straightforward interpretation of these results is that FCC rulings 
regarding low power FM had no visible impact on broadcast station values, and 
Congressional actions had no positive effect. Both components of the null hypothesis can 
be rejected at any standard significance level. Dropping the McCain bills from the events 
in Congress does not alter results. The stock price reaction to Congressional events is in 
                                                                                                                                                 
also include results using the bootstrap method (specifications 3 and 4), which provide efficient estimators 
when error terms are not normally distributed (Freedman and Peters 1984; Efron 1982: 35-6; Johnston and 
DiNardo 1997: 362-8).      
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the opposite direction from that predicted by the null. The McCain bills and FCC rulings 
have no discernible relationship with broadcaster returns.  
Regression analysis of news stories. We also tested whether stories about low 
power FM in the  Wall Street Journal  or the New York Times were associated with 
abnormal broadcaster returns.  The news were classified in two categories: “FCC goes 
ahead” (negative news for existing FM radio stations and positive for low power FM 
entrants); and “Congress prevails” (positive for existing FM stations). We identified eight 
“FCC goes ahead” (eight articles) and eight “Congress prevails” (eight articles).
46 See 
Table 7. We regress broadcast radio equity returns against the SP500 index and dummies 
for FCC and Congress news events as in Equation (2).
47 The results show insignificant 
negative returns across all news events. See Table 8. 
 We interpret this as further evidence tending to reject the null hypothesis. As the 
FCC’s plan did not threaten equity values, Congress did not visibly bolster them. The fact 
that news coverage was lax, however, is perhaps more telling.
48 It appears that low power 
FM became a political or human interest story, and failed to obtain the immediacy 
associated with an event of economic significance to investors.
49 
 
Table 7. WSJ and NYT News Stories about Low power FM Ruling 
News  Date 
   
FCC Goes Ahead   
   
FCC Offers Low power FM Stations. Stephen Labaton, NYT page C1.  Jan 29, 1999 
FCC is Set to Open Air Waves to Low power Radio. Kathy Chen, WSJ 
page B12. 
Jan 17, 2000 
FCC to Approve Low power Radio for Wider Access. Stephen Labaton, 
NYT page A1. 
Jan 20, 2000 
                                                 
46 As before, we eliminate observations of news appearing between the window period of [t-2 to t+1] of a 
stock down or upgrade listed in “Analyst History” in Yahoo!Finance web site. 
47 In other words, we re-estimated Equation (2) using NYT and WSJ news events in place of actual 
regulatory or legislative events. 
48 Many important developments went unreported entirely. For example, when Rep. Oxley introduced the 
first bill in Congress opposing the low power FM initiative no report appeared in either the Journal nor the 
Times. The next regulatory event concerning low power FM in Congress was reported twelve days after the 
fact. 
49 A review of the six firms’ Annual Reports submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission does 
not provide evidence that the low power FM initiative was perceived as harmful. Indeed in Hispanic 
Broadcasting’s report the new low power FM service is not mentioned. In the other five we found a short 
paragraph stating that they cannot predict in advance how this new low power FM service will affect their 
business. See SEC filings, Form 10-K405, year 2000.
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FCC to Open Airwaves. Stephen Labaton, NYT page 4-2 Week in 
Review. 
Jan 23, 2000 
Upstarts in Radio’s Land of the Bland. Jesse Walker, NYT page A15 
(op-ed). 
Jan 29, 2000 
FCC Moves Forward on Issuing Low power FM Licenses. NYT page 
C8. 
Mar 28, 2000 
New FCC Rules Could Smooth Way For Low power Stations. Stephen 
Labaton, NYT page C2.  
Sep 22, 2000 
255 Licenses are Awarded for Low power FM Radio. Stephen Labaton, 
NYT page C5. 
Dec 22, 2000 
   
Congress Prevails   
   
FCC Gets Static for Promoting Tiny Stations. Mark Wigfield, WSJ page 
A9. 
Feb 22, 2000 
Panel Clears Bill to Curb Low power Radio Stations. WSJ page A8.  Mar 30, 2000 
Static Over Low powered Radio. NYT page A26 Editorial.  Mar 31, 2000 
House Clears Bill to Curb Plans for FM. Stephen Labaton, NYT page 
C1. 
Apr 14, 2000 
Communications Lobby Puts Full-Court Press on Congress. Stephen 
Labaton, NYT page A1. 
Oct 24, 2000 
Congress Severely Curtails Plan for Low power Radio Stations. Stephen 
Labaton, NYT page A1. 
Dec 19, 2000 
US Bill Could Curb FCC Licensing Plans. WSJ page B12.  Dec 20, 2000 
Radio Diversity Curtailed. Stephen Labaton, NYT page 4-2.   Dec 24, 2000 
Source:  THE  WALL STREET JOURNAL (WSJ) and  THE  NEW YORK TIMES (NYT) from 
Lexis-Nexis database. 
 
Table 8: Estimated Effects of News Stories on Radio Returns 
Dependent variable is 3-day change (%) returns to broadcast station equity owners. 
Variables  OLS with Newey-West 
standard errors 
  Bootstrap estimates 
(10,000 iterations) 
SP500 index  1.297 
(15.61)* 
  1.297 
(20.78)* 
News FCC goes ahead with plan  -0.535 
(-0.39) 
  -0.568 
(-0.43) 
News Congress prevails  -2.075 
(-1.50) 
  -2.073 
(-1.63) 
No. observations  3,894    N/A 
R-squared  0.105    N/A 
Notes: t statistics in parenthesis; * = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; *** = 90% 
confidence level; N/A = Not applicable. 
 
      
 
          28
 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Previous research has developed a general framework in which Congress, the 
principal, delegates administrative responsibility to an independent regulatory 
commission, the agent. When principal-agent disputes arise, the principal may reclaim 
public policy through, for instance, direct legislation. That such action becomes 
occasionally necessary suggests that the agent may be straying a considerable distance 
from its assigned task.  
Empirical examination of the Congressional Dominance view of regulation has 
yielded evidence that regulatory agents respond to changing congressional demands. But 
moving regulators  towards the congressional position does not necessarily move 
regulators to the congressional position. Hence, the scholarly debate may be informed by 
evidence illuminating the distance separating the positions of the respective parties. Most 
informative in such an analysis is information regarding the position of the set of true 
principals, consumers. 
In the case of low power FM radio, policy position metrics are observable and 
quantifiable. We have found that, despite selecting a regulatory skirmish in which the 
publicly stated differences between Congress and the FCC were large, the regulatory 
commission chose to locate its policy at a point virtually indistinguishable from that 
selected by Congress when compared to the pro-consumer policy choice. An intense 
battle was waged over the  one-percent of low power FM station capacity the FCC 
attempted to open to entry. Even this minimalist approach to new entry was offset by 
extensive barriers imposed by the regulatory agency, limiting the financial 
competitiveness of entrants. This interpretation of events is supported by empirical 
evidence gleaned from the financial markets. Incumbent radio stations did not suffer a 
loss in value associated with FCC actions to “open” the FM dial to new low power 
assignments, nor did they enjoy windfall gains when congressional actions challenged 
and then limited the FCC initiative. 
The low power FM regulatory case supports the Congressional Dominance view 
of government regulation. Despite the seemingly divergent policy options between the 
FCC and Congress, the political fight was over trivial increments of competitive entry.
50 
                                                 
50 Such flamboyant scuffling over essentially fixed policies has long been a noted feature of FCC broadcast 
regulation. Former FCC member, now University of Virginia law professor, Glen O. Robinson is credited      
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This modest margin was sufficient to provoke interest group rent-seeking and Congress 
supplied a policy amendment. This created an opportunity for “credit-claming” and 
“blame-shifting,” while the underlying regulatory equilibrium was never seriously 
challenged. 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the generic descriptor: “full of fake grunts and groans, signifying nothing.” (in Geller 1994: 15). See 
also Coase (1965).       
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Appendix 1: Summary of Changes in FCC Low power FM Rule Making 
Issue  Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (Jan 1999) 
Report and Order 
(Jan 2000) 
Memorandum 
Opinion & Order (Sep 
2000) 
Power and 
type of service 
3 classes:  
1000-watt: primary 
100-watt: secondary 
10-watt: secondary to all 
including 100-watt 
 
2 classes (1000-watt: 
dismissed): 
100-watt: secondary  
10-watt: secondary to all 
including 100-watt 





To all primary service 
stations: co-channel, 1
st 
adjacent channel and 
Intermediate Frequency 
interference (IF). Receive 
protection only from other 
low power FM stations.  
Same as NPRM plus: 2
nd 
adjacent channel 
protection, Protect TV 
channel 6; translators and 
boosters; class-D; other 
100-watt; future primary 
service stations, and 
upgrades. 
 
Same as in Report and 
Order plus protect FM 
stations providing 






Same as 100-watt except 
IF protection, plus 
protection to 100-watt, 




Receive protection only 
from other 10-watt 
stations. 
 
Same as 10-watt in 
NPRM, plus protection to 
2
nd adjacent channel, IF 
and TV Channel-6.   
 
Same as in Report and 
Order plus protect FM 
stations providing 





Low power FM licensees 
cannot: 
1) Own full power radio 
stations. 
2) Own another low 
power station in same 
community. 
 
Same as NPRM plus: 
1) Max. stations owned 
per entity nationwide: 5 
after two years, 10 after 3 
years. 
2) Licenses not 
transferable. 
3) No newspaper or other 
media entity owner.  
4) No pirate stations 
allowed. 
Same as in Report and 
Order plus slightly 
relaxed restrictions on 





and government orgs. 
Advertising  No decision  Not permitted 
 
Same as in R&O 
Channels 
available 





Not available  1,000  1,000 
Source: FCC (1999); FCC (2000a); FCC (2000b). 
a The FCC never gave an estimate number. This is based on press articles. See for example: Stephen 
Labaton,  Congress Severely Curtails Plan For Low power Radio Stations,  THE  NEW  YORK  TIMES 
(December 19, 2000).      
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Appendix 2: Main Events in Congress 
 
•  November 17, 1999. Rep. Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio), a senior member of the 
Commerce Committee (with FCC oversight) introduced HR-3439, a bill to 
prohibit the FCC from establishing low power FM rules. On February 10, 2000, 
Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) introduced an identical bill, S-2068, in the Senate. 
•  April 10, 2000. The House Commerce Committee issued Report No. 106-567 
approving HR-3439 with amendments. The report did not prohibit the FCC from 
establishing a new low power FM service, but imposed the same level of 
protection afforded by full-power FM stations. The FCC was also required to 
conduct tests, r eporting findings to Congress on the degree of harmful 
interference caused to existing FM stations before considering elimination of 3
rd 
adjacent channel protection. This report had to include an analysis of the 
economic impact of low power FM competition on incumbent FM stations.  
•  April 13, 2000. The House of Representatives approved the Radio Broadcasting 
Preservation Act of 2000 (HR-3439), by a vote of 274––110.
51 
•   May 8 and July 27, 2000. Senator John McCain (R-AZ, Chair of the Senate 
Commerce Committee) introduced S -2518 and S -2989, respectively. The first 
measure gave the National Academy of Science a key role in determining harmful 
interference from low power FM. The second bill re-assigned responsibility to the 
FCC, while adding a mechanism for compensating incumbent FM stations should 
harmful interference occur. The measure was seen to advance low power FM by 
removing the interference issue from the FCC’s rule making process.
52  
•  September 7, 2000. Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) introduced S-3020, identical to 
HR-3439.  
                                                 
51 Republicans voted 188 in favor and 3 against; Democrats voted 85 in favor and 106 against. Congress of 
the U.S., Final vote results for Roll Call 130, April 13, 2000. http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-
in/vote.exe?year =2000&rollnumber=130. 
52 The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the leading trade group for incumbent FM stations 
responded furiously: “The McCain/Kerry Low power Radio Act introduced yesterday should be renamed 
the ’Interference Assurance Act’……..Even though the FCC acknowledges there will be interference on the 
FM band, both lawmakers prefer that the FCC deal with it after the fact, rather than trying to solve the 
problem before…” NAB, Statement by NAB President/CEO Eddie Fritts, RE: McCain/Kerry Low power 
FM Bill (July 28, 2000). www.nab.org/newsroom/pressrel/STATEMENTS/S1500.HTM, visited February 
28, 2001.      
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•  October 25, 2000. Rep. Harold Rogers (R-KY) introduced HR-5548, an 
appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, 
and related agencies. Section 632 of the bill follows HR-3439. The bill was 
referred to the Committee on Appropriations. On October 26, the Conference 
Report containing section 632 was approved 206 to 198.
53 On October 27, the 
Senate approved the Conference Report, and on December 21, 2000 President 
Clinton signed the measure that became Public Law No. 106-553. Initial estimates 
were that only 20 to 25 percent of the eligible low power FM stations would be 
licensed under this law.
 54 
•  February 27, 2001. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduces S -404, a bill to 
facilitate the resolution of interference disputes over new low power service. 
However, it does not lift the severe restrictions imposed on low power FM. 
                                                 
53 U.S. Congress, Bill Summary And Status For The 106
th Congress, HR-4942, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR04942@@@L&summ2=m&, (visited February 22, 2001). Of the 206 votes in 
favor, 185 were Republican and 19 Democratic. Of the 198 votes against, 19 were Republican and 178 
Democratic. 
54 Or 200 to 250 new low power FM stations. This estimate was revised upward based on the first two 
groups of accepted low power FM license applications issued by the FCC. See Congress Partly Overrules 
FCC, Cuts LPFM Back, LPFM Legislation in Congress, The Center for Democratic Communications of the 
National Lawyers Guild, www.nlgcdc.org/legislation.htm (visited April 23, 2001).       
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Appendix 3: Estimating the Low power Station Insert Capacity of the FM Band 
   To estimate the number of new 100-watt stations that could be added to the FM 
band under assumptions given in the text, we followed these six steps: 
1)  Define market areas. We used Arbitron’s list of radio markets ranked by 
population.
55 According to this classification, the United States is divided in 276 markets. 
The largest market is New York City, featuring an estimated population of nearly 14.5 
million persons above age 12. Market area estimates were obtained by associating each 
radio market with the corresponding Metropolitan Statistical Area used by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.
56 In some cases it was necessary to aggregate areas. 
2) Identify FM stations in each market. This information was obtained from BIA 
Financial, Radio Yearbook 2000, which lists all FM stations in each Arbitron market. To 
avoid double counting, we eliminated stations with the same call number or frequency. 
We also eliminated seven Arbitron markets embedded in other markets. The final listing 
yielded 269 radio market featuring 3,736 FM radio stations. 
3) Estimate available channels for new low power stations in each market. We assume 
that each existing FM station needs co-channel and 1
st adjacent channel protection from 
the signals of full-power FM or low power FM stations. This entitles existing FM stations 
to three channels, as shown in Figure 5. As the FM band has 100 channels, available 
channels per market are calculated by: [100-3X], where X is the number of existing FM 
stations in a given market. 
 
 
Chan1  Chan2  Chan3  Chan4  Chan5  Chan6  Chan7  Chan8  Chan9 
                 
                 
Buffer  Occupied  Buffer  Occupied  Buffer  Occupied  Buffer 
 
Figure 5: Channels Used by Full power FM Stations 
 
                                                 
55 Arbitron Corporation, Market rankings: Fall 1999, http://www.arbitron.com/radiosurvey/mm001025.htm  
56 Arbitron market areas are based on standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas used by the US Census 
Bureau. http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_ma.txt. See also BIA Research Inc, “Radio 
Markets Report 2000” which provides maps for each radio market.      
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4) Estimating the number of 100-watt stations that could safely broadcast in each 
free channel. We assume that each 100-watt station has a contour area equivalent to a 
square of 8x8 miles. Thus the total number of insert stations per free channel in a given 
market is calculated by: [Market Area/64], where the market area is measured in square 
miles. The area of each radio market was obtained from the US Census Bureau. 
5) Adjusting for blanketing interference.  We assume that the area blanketed by a 
full power FM station is equivalent to a low power FM contour area, or 64 square miles.
57 
This reduces the area available for new low power FM stations by 64X square miles in 
each radio market. Hence, new low power FM insert capacity per market is given by: 
[(100-3X) (Market Area-64X)/64]. 
6) Aggregation. Aggregating to national insert capacity, Y, is calculated as: 





64 / ) 64 ( 3 100
i
i i i X Area X Y  
Numerical results are summarized in Table 2.
                                                 
57 This is far more than actual blanketing interference. See discussion in text.      
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